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1. Introduction
In virtually every industrialized country the total fertility rate has been declining for
more than four decades, and ever since the 1980s it has been below the 2.1 children
per woman needed for a population to replace itself (see Figure 1).1 Countries with
sub-replacement fertility fall into two distinct groups. In countries where birth rates
are moderately below replacement level, the population size falls only slowly and,
if considered necessary, can be supplemented with migration. In contrast, countries
where the fertility rate has fallen below 1.5 births per woman and has stayed below
this threshold are said to be locked into a “low fertility trap” (McDonald [2006]).
The notion of a low fertility trap captures the idea that once fertility falls below a
certain threshold and stays there for a while it can lead to self-reinforcing mechanisms
that are difficult to reverse. One such mechanism is a negative population momentum,
that is, the tendency of a population to decline due to the small cohorts born since
the 1980s entering their reproductive ages (Lutz et al. [2003]). Another possible
mechanism is behavioral: if very low fertility is sustained for a long period of time,
preferences can begin to shift away from childbearing, and a reversal of low fertility
becomes much more difficult (Goldstein et al. [2003], Rindfuss et al. [2004]).
The anticipated economic consequences for countries in the low fertility trap are
manifold, from a shortage of skilled young workers to a population ageing-related
slowdown in the growth of GDP to an increase in age-related public spending (Grant
et al. [2006]). Demographers have recognized that a small increase or stabilization of
total fertility could help countries in or at the brink of the low fertility trap prevent
these economic problems from taking effect. Traditionally, most debates on stabilizing
fertility rates focused on policies such as flexible working, maternity and paternity
leave, and increasing benefits for second and third children. However, policymakers
have recently started to take note of the potential role in stabilizing fertility rates of
assisted reproductive technologies.
Assisted reproductive technologies(ART) cover a range of biomedical procedures
[e.g., in vitro fertilization (IVF), intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), gamete in-
trafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT)], all of which have
the ultimate aim of assisting subfertile couples who are having difficulties conceiving
to become pregnant and achieve the birth of a healthy child. Since natural female
1The replacement fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman includes two children to replace the
parents plus one-tenth of child to replace offspring who do not reach the age of 15.
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Figure 1: Fertility and Age Patterns of Childbear-
ing in Industrialized and Emerging Countries. Source:
United Nations Population Division: World Popula-
tion Prospect: The 2004 Revision. Available online at
http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
fertility falls gradually after the age of 30, with a rapid decline after the age of 35,2
it is predominantly older people reaching the end of their fertile lives who are sen-
sitive to fertility techniques. From a practical viewpoint, ART is an area of rapid
technological change, and currently accounts for 1 to 3 percent of annual births in
developed countries (Gosden et al. [2003]).
While fertility rates depend on biomedical factors that affect the ability to con-
ceive, they are also heavily influenced by behavioral factors, particularly the inter-
related decisions that are made about both the number of children to have and the
age at which to try to have children. This is reflected in Figure 1 which shows that
2Indeed, evidence suggests that in the age-range 35-39 (respectively, in the age range 40-44) it is
almost 20 percent (respectively, 50 percent) less likely for a woman to conceive compared to women
aged 25-29 years ceteris paribus (De la Rochebrochard [2001]). Male fecundity, in contrast, is at its
highest between the ages of 30 and 34, after which it decreases, although not as quick as for women.
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(i) in countries where fertility rates are below the replacement rate but above the
low fertility trap, births to women aged 30 years or older account for more than 40
percent of the total fertility rate, implying that the mean age of all mothers who give
birth (in a given year) is relatively high; (ii) while some countries in the low fertility
trap are associated with a relatively high average age at which women give birth, in
others women give birth at quite a young age. So while biomedical factors would
have suggested a negative correlation between fertility and the average age at which
women give birth, Figure 1 suggests a positive correlation.
Figure 1 also suggests that there are likely to be powerful socio-economic factors
driving observed reproductive behavior since, broadly speaking, those countries that
display both low fertility rates and low proportions of births to older women are
mainly Eastern European (the “East”); those with very low fertility rates but high
proportions of births to older women are mainly Southern European (the “South”),
whereas those where both fertility rates and proportions of births to older women
are high are largely Anglo-Saxon, Continental European, and Nordic countries (the
“North”). Moreover, these groups of countries can be distinguished not only in terms
of reproductive behavior, but also in terms of institutional factors that affect the
labor cost of having children and the quality and availability of formal childcare.
Against this empirical background, this paper pursues two related objectives. The
first half of the paper develops a simple model that allows us to explain the different
reproductive patterns observed across industrialized and emerging countries. In the
second half of the paper, we use the model to assess the biomedical and behavioral
effects of improvements in assisted reproductive technologies, and hence the impact
of these technologies on fertility rates.3
The proposed model is one in which women make decisions about education, work,
and whether and when to have children. When assessing the “cost side” of having
children, women take into account the impact of fertility choices on earnings and
career opportunities. First, there is the direct loss of earnings through not working
3The current paper therefore fits into the theoretical literature on the economic analysis of
fertility. Earlier work in this literature has focused on the study of the total number of children
born to a couple. This work includes the theory of the quantity-quality tradeoff developed by
Gary Becker and his associates (Becker [1960], Becker and Lewis [1973], and Becker and Tomes
[1976]). More recent theoretical studies (Cigno [1983], Ermisch and Cigno [1989]) have looked at
the distribution of births over a woman’s lifetime. To our knowledge, the present paper contains the
fullest analysis so far of (i) the economic determinants of differences in reproductive behavior across
industrialized and emerging countries, and (ii) the biomedical environment within which women
make fertility choices.
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during the periods of child-rearing, the size of which may depend on the quality and
availability of formal childcare. Second, there is the long-term impact that early
career interruptions in order to have children can have on future earnings, which may
manifest itself in a wage penalty associated with motherhood.4 On the “benefit side”
of having children, the utility of parenthood is linked to basic aspects of preferences,
which may reflect individual attitudes, social norms, and cultural climates.
The key question is, then, how cross-country differences in these various cost and
benefit factors determine not just the observed pattern of behavior in Figure 1, but
also the response of women in different countries to the availability of new ART. Our
answer to this question is derived in three steps.
First, we show that cross-country differences in (i) institutional factors that affect
the earnings opportunities of mothers and (ii) social policies that affect the cost of rais-
ing children are sufficient to rationalize the different reproductive patterns observed
in Figure 1.5 The model tells us, for example, that the demographic distinctiveness
of the “South” can largely be attributed to a comparatively high wage penalty as-
sociated with motherhood. Cross-country variations in the quality and availability
of formal childcare, in contrast, generate a positive correlation between fertility rates
and proportions of births to older women, and hence can explain the most distinctive
features of the reproductive patterns in the “North” and the “East”, respectively.6
Having established this, we look at the issue of assisted reproductive technologies
(ART). We show that improvements in ART should have the direct biomedical effect
of improving fertility rates. However, they could also cause indirect changes in be-
havior which could offset the direct effect. In particular, the availability of improved
ART could cause some women who would otherwise have tried to have children earlier
on in life to postpone childbirth to later in life when, despite ART, the conception
success probability is lower. We show that this negative behavioral effect may offset
the positive biomedical effect, and so lead to a reduction of the fertility rate.
Finally, we use our model to assess the effects of ART from a macroeconomic
4A large body of evidence suggests that mother’s earnings suffer from a “family gap in pay” which
refers to the differential in wages between women with and without children (see, e.g., Waldfogel
[1998]). There are a number of channels through which such a family gap can arise: a reduction in
labor market experience; the need to take part-time jobs or, more generally, reduced flexibility in
hours and out-of hours networking opportunities, which can affect promotion prospects.
5As will become apparent later, by “sufficient” we mean that our model does not need to appeal
to systematic cross-country differences in preferences to explain existing reproductive behavior.
6As we shall demonstrate below, these predictions accord well with evidence from cross-country
data.
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perspective. We show that the negative behavioral effect that induces people to
postpone childbirth is most pronounced in economic environments that are conducive
to high levels of fertility. This, in turn, allows us to demonstrate that improvements
in ART can have a negative effect in high-fertility countries, a positive effect in low-
fertility countries, and so lead to a convergence of fertility rates across countries.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we
present the basic model and provide an analysis of individual choices regarding edu-
cation, work and fertility. Section 3 derives a number of comparative statics results on
the economic determinants of fertility and age patterns of childbearing. The results
are used to explain differences in reproductive behavior across countries. In Section 4
we assess the impact of assisted reproductive technologies on fertility rates and spell
out the implications from a macroeconomic perspective. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
The model we propose is one of individual decision-making, with women acting alone
to make decisions about education, work, the number of children to have and when
to have them. An obvious important direction for future research is to extend this to
a family bargaining framework.
2.1. The Environment. The model has two time periods, 1 and 2, and a contin-
uum of individuals. A key feature of the model is that individuals have knowledge
of their decreasing biological fertility, in the sense that they know that their ability
to conceive is higher in period 1 than in period 2. Thus, period 1 of our model sees
younger people with a relatively high natural fecundity, while period has older people
facing the end of their fertile lives. We assume that each individual wants at most
one child. At the start of each period an individual can, if she wishes, make a single
attempt to have a child. The probability that the attempt to have a child in period
t = 1, 2 will be successful is pt, where 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1. The success of the attempt to have
a child is known at the start of each period before a woman needs to make any other
decisions. Older individuals reaching the end of their fertile lives are sensitive to
technological alternatives to conceiving naturally. Below, we shall therefore assume
that the conception success probability of older individuals, p2, can be increased by
providing more or better ART treatments. We assume that the age-specific concep-
tion success probabilities are such that 0 ≤ p2 < p1 ≤ 1. This assumption captures
the fact that a woman’s biological fertility starts to drop sharply over the age of 35,
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and older women find it harder to conceive either naturally or with the help of ART.
The parameters p1 and p2 capture the bio-medical features of the environment within
which women make their decisions.
All education takes place in period 1. Let e, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1, be the fraction of the first
period spent in education, and let w(e) be the wage rate that an individual gets as
a result of education, where w′(·) > 0 and w′′(·) 6 0. The function w(·) captures the
educational opportunities open to women.
Turning to the payoff consequences of parenthood, it is well understood that
women’s earnings can suffer from a “price of motherhood” or “family gap in pay”,
which refers to the differential in wages between women with and without children.
After controlling for differences in characteristics such as education and work expe-
rience, researchers typically find a family penalty of 10-15 percent for women with
children as compared to women without children (Korenman and Neumark [1992],
Waldfogel [1997], Waldfogel [1998], Davies and Pierre [2005], Dupuy and Ferna´ndez-
Kranz [2007]). However this family gap varies significantly across countries. Moreover
there is evidence that this gap is larger for women who have children early than for
women who have children later in life. Letting ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 1, denote the family gap in
pay, we capture the presence of such a family gap by assuming that if a woman has
a child in period 1 her earnings in period 2 are a fraction 1 − ǫ of those she would
have obtained had she been childless.
There is no leisure so that the only activities to which time is ever allocated are
education, child care, and work. We assume that if an individual has a child in any
period, then she has to spend a fraction c, 0 < c < 1, of that period in child care. The
parameter c captures the quality and availability of formal childcare. For example,
the availability of pre-school education and childcare in nurseries would reduce the
fraction c of any period that a mother has to spend in childcare. Just as the family
gap in pay, the supply of formal childcare also varies considerably across countries.
For example, amongst industrialized and emerging countries the enrolment rate of
children aged 0-3 ranges from 6 to 60 percent (OECD [2007b]). Below, we shall
interpret the two parameters c and ǫ as representing the direct and indirect costs
of children, resulting from social policies that affect the cost of raising children and
labor market factors that affect the earnings opportunities of mothers.
Finally, we assume that individuals directly derive utility from having a child.
Let γt be the perceived present value of utility that an individual will get if she
succeeds in having a child in period t. Several factors may contribute to determine
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the value of children. For example, the social-demographic literature (Friedman et al.
[1994]) emphasizes the importance of individual attitudes, social norms, and cultural
climates in affecting the value attached not just whether or not to have children but
also when in life to have them.
To simplify the exposition, the following assumption on the parameters will be
maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 γ1
γ2
> p2.
As will become apparent later, this assumption rules out trivial situations in which
the equilibrium does not involve any individuals trying to have a child when young.
2.2. Analysis of Individual Decisions. Recalling that an individual will know
the outcome of a decision to have a child in any period right at the start of that period,
the individual has to choose three things: (1) whether or not to try to have a child in
period 1; (2) conditioning on the outcome of this decision the amount of education to
have in period 1; (3) conditioning on the outcome of the first decision, whether or not
to try to have a child in period 2. All these decisions are made at the start of period
1. This captures the complex interactions between education decisions and decisions
about whether and when to have children. Future utility levels are discounted with
discount factor ρ per period.
In order to make the first decision, the individual has to determine how the second
and third decisions will be made conditional on the outcome of this first decision.
Thus, let us suppose first of all that an individual does not give birth to a child in
period 1. This can happen either because they chose not to try or because they tried
and failed. They then have to decide whether or not they will try to have a child at
the start of period 2 and the amount of education to have in period 1.
Suppose an individual chooses not to try to have a child in period 2. Then
V00(e) = (1− e)w(e) + ρw(e)
gives the present value of utility of an individual who has no child in period 1, chooses
not to have a child in period 2, and has an amount of education e, where 0 ≤ e ≤ 1.
Let
Vˆ00 = max
e≥0
V00(e) and eˆ00 = argmax
e≥0
V00(e).
Then Vˆ00 gives the utility an individual who is childless at the start of period 1 will
get if she chooses not to have a child in period 2, and eˆ00 is the amount of education
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that such an individual will choose. In what follows it will be useful to let
Vˆ (z) = max
e≥0
(z − e)w(e) and eˆ(z) = argmax
e≥0
(z − e)w(e).
The first-order condition for e is
(z − e)w′(e) = w(e). (1)
It is easy to see from (1) that eˆ′(z) > 0, and, from the envelope theorem, that
Vˆ ′(z) = w[eˆ(z)] > 0. Furthermore, Vˆ ′′(z) = w′[eˆ(z)]eˆ′(z) > 0. It now follows
immediately that
Vˆ00 ≡ Vˆ (1 + ρ) and eˆ00 ≡ eˆ(1 + ρ).
Next suppose that an individual who does not have a child at the start of period
1 chooses to try to have a child at the start of period 2. Then
V01(e) = (1− e)w(e) + ρ
[
p2(1− c)w(e) + (1− p2)w(e)
]
+ p2γ2
gives the expected present value of utility of such an individual if she has an amount
of education e, where 0 ≤ e ≤ 1. Let
Vˆ01 = max
e≥0
V01(e) and eˆ01 = argmax
e≥0
V01(e).
It then follows immediately that
Vˆ01 ≡ Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− cp2)] + p2γ2 and eˆ01 ≡ eˆ[1 + ρ(1− cp2)].
Notice that, if p2 = 0, then Vˆ01 = Vˆ00 and eˆ01 = eˆ00, whereas if p2 > 0 then eˆ01 < eˆ00.
Ignoring things that happen on sets of measure zero, we can take it that an individual
who is childless in period 1 will choose to try to have a child in period 2 if and only
if Vˆ01 > Vˆ00, that is, if and only if
Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− cp2)] + p2γ2 > Vˆ (1 + ρ). (2)
It now follows immediately that
Vˆ0 = max{Vˆ00, Vˆ01}
is the (maximum) utility an individual will get if she does not have a child in period
1, taking account of the decisions that she will subsequently make.
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Now consider an individual who succeeds in having a child at the start of period
1. She will not try to have a child in period 2 so, if she has an amount of education
e, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1− c, then her present value of utility will be
V1(e) = (1− c− e)w(e) + ρ(1− ǫ)w(e) + γ1.
As before, let
Vˆ1 = max
e≥0
V1(e) and eˆ1 = argmax
e≥0
V1(e).
It then follows that
Vˆ1 ≡ Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c] + γ1 and eˆ1 ≡ eˆ [1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c] .
Finally, consider the decision as to whether or not to try to have a child in period
1. If an individual chooses not to try, then utility will be Vˆ0. If instead the individual
chooses to try, the expected utility will be p1Vˆ1+(1−p1)Vˆ0. Therefore, an individual
will try to have a child if and only if p1Vˆ1 + (1− p1)Vˆ0 > Vˆ0, that is, if and only if
Vˆ1 > Vˆ0 (3)
which is independent of p1.
Notice that 1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c < 1 + ρ(1− p2c) < 1 + ρ, and so
eˆ1 < eˆ01 < eˆ00
and
Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c] < Vˆ [(1 + ρ(1− p2c)] < Vˆ (1 + ρ).
2.3. Population Heterogeneity. So far we have looked at a typical generic in-
dividual. Consider now a more explicit recognition of population heterogeneity by
replacing the wage function w(e) by the function ω(a, e) ≡ aw(e) where a > 0 is a
parameter measuring ability. We assume hereafter that the a’s are distributed ac-
cording to a probability density function f(a), with support (0,∞) and associated
cumulative distribution function F (a).
Notice that, from (1), education choices are independent of a and depend solely
on childbirth outcomes: a person who is childless in period 1 and plans to remain
childless will undertake more education than someone who is childless but plans to
try for children in period 2, who in turn will undertake more education than someone
who has given birth in period 1. So we have:
Vˆ00(a) = aVˆ (1 + ρ) (4)
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Vˆ01(a) = aVˆ [1 + ρ(1− p2c)] + p2γ2 (5)
Vˆ0(a) = max{Vˆ00(a), Vˆ01(a)} (6)
Vˆ1(a) = aVˆ [1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c] + γ1 (7)
We now want to understand what decisions various types of women will make. To
do this we define the following three variables. First, let a0 be the point of intersection
between V00(a) and V01(a). From (4) and (5) we see that
a0 ≡
p2γ2
Vˆ (1 + ρ)− Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− p2c)]
. (8)
Second, denoting the point of intersection between Vˆ1(a) and Vˆ00(a) by a˜, then, from
(4) and (7), we have
a˜ ≡
γ1
Vˆ (1 + ρ)− Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c]
. (9)
Notice that a˜ does not depend on p2. Finally, if we denote the point of intersection
between Vˆ1(a) and Vˆ01(a) by a1, then from (5) and (7) we have:
a1 ≡
γ1 − p2γ2
Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− p2c)]− Vˆ [1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c]
. (10)
We now note the following result :
Lemma 1 a1 T a˜ if and only if a˜ T a0.
The proof of this result is straightforward and hence omitted. Building on this lemma,
it is easy to establish:
Proposition 1 There are only two possible modes of individual decision-making:
Case “Early Childbearing”: If a0 < a˜ < a1, then the population can be divided into
three subgroups, according to the ability parameter a.
a. Individuals in the low ability range [0, a0] will try to have a child in period 1
and, if they fail, will try again in period 2.
b. Individuals in the medium ability range [a0, a˜] will also try to have a child in
period 1, but, if they fail, will not try again in period 2.
c. Individuals in the high ability range [a˜,∞) will not try to have a child in either
period 1 or period 2 and so will remain childless out of choice.
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Figure 2: TwoModes of Individual Decision-Making.
Case “Postponed Childbearing”: If a1 < a˜ < a0, then once again the population can
be divided into three groups.
a. Individuals in the lowest ability range [0, a1] will try to have a child in period 1
and, if they fail will try again in period 2.
b. Individuals in the medium ability range [a1, a0] will not try to have a child in
period 1, but will postpone the attempt to have a child to period 2.
c. Individuals in the high ability range [a0,∞) will not try to have a child in either
period 1 or period 2 and so will be voluntarily childless.
The result is illustrated in Figure 2. Notice that the decisions of low ability women
and high ability women are identical in the two cases: low ability women try to have
children in both periods while high ability women try in neither; women with middle
ability try to have a child in just one period. In the “Early Childbearing” case this
is period 1, whereas in the “Postponed Childbearing” case this is in period 2.
From the definitions and results we have established above, it is also straightfor-
ward to determine the conditions under which a given society will fall into the “Early
Childbearing” or the “Postponed Childbearing” scenario:
12
Lemma 2 Define
∆ ≡ p2
[
γ2
γ1
·
Vˆ (1 + ρ)− Vˆ (1 + ρ(1− ǫ)− c)
Vˆ (1 + ρ)− Vˆ (1 + ρ(1− p2c))
]
(11)
a. If ∆ 6 1, then a0 6 a˜ 6 a1 (Case “Early Childbearing”).
b. If ∆ > 1, then a1 < a˜ < a0 (Case “Postponed Childbearing”).
Notice that if we take a linear approximation in both the numerator and the denom-
inator of (11) then we can re-write the expression for ∆ as
∆ ≃
[
γ2
ργ1
]
·
[
1 +
ρǫ
c
]
. (12)
On the one hand, if we fix all parameters other than c, then there exists a c∗ ∈ [0, 1]
such that ∆ > 1 if and only if c < c∗. This means that case “Postponed Childbearing”
is more likely to arise if the direct costs of childbearing, c, are relatively low ceteris
paribus. The intuition runs as follows. While giving up time to raise children causes a
loss of earned income whenever children are born, because women who have children
in period 1 invest less in education, the income loss is smaller for early childbirth
than for late childbirth. On the other hand, if we fix all parameters other than
ǫ, then there exists a ǫ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that ∆ > 1 if and only if ǫ > ǫ∗. So case
“Postponed Childbearing”is more likely to emerge if the labor costs of childbearing,
ǫ, are relatively high ceteris paribus. Intuitively, if women anticipate that a significant
family gap in pay kicks in if they have children early this tends to push them towards
postponing childbearing. Finally, turning to the values attached to childbearing at
different ages as captured by γ1 and γ2, a relatively high value attached to having
children at older ages pushes a society towards the postponed childbearing regime.
3. Explaining Fertility and Age Patterns of Childbearing
The first main benefit of our model is that it provides a clear-cut way for thinking
about the economic determinants of observed fertility and childbearing age patterns.
However, before we can proceed, we need to first determine two society level variables
– the fertility rate and the incidence of childbearing at older ages – that arise from
the individual decisions characterized above.
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3.1. Fertility Rate and Incidence of Childbearing at Older Ages. The fer-
tility rate, Φ, is the population-weighted number of births. A natural measure for
the age pattern of childbearing is the incidence of childbearing at older ages, i.e., the
proportion of births that occur in period 2 - which we denote by Ψ. Applying these
measures to the two cases identified above, it is readily checked that when a society
is characterized by “Early Childbearing”, then the fertility rate is
Φ = F (a˜)p1 + F (a0)(1− p1)p2, (13)
while the incidence of childbearing at old ages is
Ψ =
F (a0)[1− p1]p2
F (a˜)p1 + F (a0)(1− p1)p2
. (14)
In a society characterized by “Postponed Childbearing” the fertility rate is
Φ = F (a1)p1 + [F (a0)− p1F (a1)] p2, (15)
while the incidence of childbearing at old ages is
Ψ =
[F (a0)− p1F (a1)]p2
F (a1)p1 + [F (a0)− p1F (a1)] p2
. (16)
3.2. Comparative Statics. Building on these measures, in this subsection we per-
form comparative statics and unveil factors that help explain existing reproductive
patterns. The two key economic parameters in our analysis are c and ǫ. As we noted
earlier, the parameter c could be thought of as a measure of the quality and availabil-
ity of formal child care: a well functioning child care system reduces the fraction c of
any period that a parent has to spend in child care. The parameter ǫ is a measure
of the wage penalty associated with entering motherhood at a young age. As a key
result, we establish that the behavior observed in Figure 1 arises endogenously from
our model when comparative static results on c and ǫ are combined.
It is useful to conduct our analysis in elasticity form. One particular elasticity
that turns out to be important is the elasticity of the cumulative distribution function
F (a) with respect to a. We will need to know how this elasticity varies at different
points on the ability distribution. For ease of notation, we will denote this particular
elasticity by g(a) ≡ af(a)
F (a)
. Most commonly-used distributions that have closed-form
cumulative distribution functions have the property that g(a) ≡ af(a)
F (a)
is decreasing
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in a.7 We therefore assume:
Assumption 2 g′(a) < 0.
Lastly, we denote by ηx ≡
∂y
∂x
· x
y
the elasticity of some variable y with respect to
another variable x. Now, for any x ∈ {c, ǫ}, it is straightforward to see from (13) and
(14) that in the case of “Early Childbearing”:
ηΦx = (1−Ψ)g(a˜)η
a˜
x +Ψg(a0)η
a0
x (17)
and
ηΨx = (1−Ψ)
[
g(a˜)
(
−ηa˜x
)
− g(a0) (−η
a0
x )
]
. (18)
It is also readily checked from (15) and (16) that in the “Postponed Childbearing”
case:
ηΦx = [1− (1− p2) (1−Ψ)] g(a0)η
a0
x + [(1− p2) (1−Ψ)] g(a1)η
a1
x (19)
and
ηΨx = (1−Ψ)
F (a0)
[F (a0)− p1F (a1)]
[
g(a1) (−η
a1
x )− g(a0) (−η
a0
x )
]
. (20)
Notice that the sign of each of these elasticities depends solely on the effect of
x ∈ {c, ǫ} on either a0 and a˜ (“Early Childbearing”) or on a0 and a1 (“Postponed
Childbearing”). For simplicity and ease of exposition, let us use linear approximations
to rewrite the ability thresholds (a0, a1, a˜) as:
8
a0 ≈
γ2
Vˆ ′(1 + ρ)ρc
(21)
a1 ≈
γ1 − p2γ2
Vˆ ′(1 + ρ)[ρǫ+ c(1− ρp2)]
(22)
7For example, distributions such as the exponential distribution, the Pareto distribution, the
Weibull distribution, and the arc-since distribution all have the property that g(a) is decreasing
in a. For distributions that lack a closed-form representation for the c.d.f. and for the function
g(a), a necessary condition for Assumption 2 to be satisfied is that the function lnF (a) is concave.
As shown by Bergstrom and Bagnoli [2005], this condition is satisfied by the family of probability
distributions that have log-concave density functions, which includes the normal distribution, the
gamma distribution, the chi-squared distribution, and the beta distribution.
8We use these linear approximations purely to simplify the exposition of some of our results,
but, it should be emphasized, without affecting our main insights. Indeed, it can be verified that
all comparative static results in this subsection are robust to using the non-linearized expressions of
(a0, a1, a˜).
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a˜ ≈
γ1
Vˆ ′(1 + ρ)(ρǫ+ c)
(23)
Using these linear approximations, it follows immediately that:
ηa0c = −1, η
a0
ǫ = 0,
ηa1c = −
c(1− ρp2)
ρǫ+ c(1− ρp2)
, ηa1ǫ = −
ρǫ
ρǫ + c(1− ρp2)
,
ηa˜c = −
c
ρǫ+ c
, ηa˜ǫ = −
ρǫ
ρǫ+ c
.
(24)
It is now straightforward to establish:
Proposition 2 Assume that Assumption 2 is satisfied. Then the following compar-
ative static results are obtained:
In the “Early Childbearing” regime (∆ 6 1), the fertility rate, Φ, is strictly decreasing
in both ǫ and c. The proportion of births to older women, Ψ, is strictly increasing in
ǫ and strictly decreasing in c.
In the “Postponed Childbearing” regime (∆ > 1), the fertility rate, Φ, is strictly de-
creasing in both ǫ and c. The proportion of births to older women, Ψp, is strictly in-
creasing in ǫ. Moreover, Ψ is strictly decreasing in c provided −ηa1c g(a1) < −η
a0
c g(a0).
Notice that the comparative static results are similar across the two regimes. How-
ever, there are no clear-cut qualitative predictions about the impact of c on Ψ in
the “Postponed Childbearing” case. Indeed, since in this case a0 > a1, it follows
from Assumption 1 that g(a0) < g(a1), while from (24) it can be readily seen that
−ηa0c > −η
a1
c . Thus all we can say is that close to the boundary of the “Postponed
Childbearing” regime – where a0 ≈ a1 – it will certainly be true that the proportion
of births to older women is decreasing in c. However it is not clear what can be said
further away from the boundary. In what follows we will simply impose:
Assumption 3 Assume that in the “Postponed Childbearing” scenario the propor-
tion of births to older women is a decreasing function of c.
There are a number of justifications for such an assumption. First, the assumption is
consistent with the fact that the larger is c the less likely it is that a society will be
in the “Postponed Childbearing” regime. Second, the assumption is also consistent
with the within-regime comparative static prediction for the “Early Childbearing”
case. Finally, having a negative relation between Ψ and c generates the observed
positive correlation between fertility and the proportion of older women giving birth
(more about this below).
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Figure 3: Economic Determinants of Differences in
Fertility and Childbearing Age Patterns.
3.3. Economic Determinants of Differences in Reproductive Behavior. An
interesting practical implication of our model arises when the comparative static re-
sults on c and ǫ are combined. The following proposition does not appeal to any
particular regime and hence applies to both the “Early Childbearing” and the “Post-
poned Childbearing” case:
Proposition 3 Suppose we compare three countries (“North”, “South”, “East”) that
are otherwise identical but differ in the quality and availability of formal childcare (c)
and the family gap in pay (ǫ). Suppose we observe that in the “North” both the fertility
rate and the average age of giving birth are high (ΦH ,ΨH); in the “South” the fertility
rate is low but the average age of giving birth is high (ΦL,ΨH); and in the “East”
both the fertility rate and the average age of giving birth are low (ΦL,ΨL). Then:
a. cnorth < csouth < ceast;
b. ǫeast S ǫnorth < ǫsouth.
Figure 3 illustrates the result. Define an iso-fertility curve (respectively, iso-age curve)
to be a line in [0, 1]2 on which all (c, ǫ)-combinations generate the same fertility Φ
(respectively, the same average age of giving birth Ψ). Notice that as we let (Φ,Ψ)
vary we get a whole family of iso-fertility and iso-age curves. From the results we have
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established in the previous subsection, and from a straightforward application of the
implicit function theorem, it is easy to see that iso-fertility curves (respectively, iso-
age curves) must have a negative slope (respectively, positive slope), and that lower
iso-fertility curves (respectively, higher iso-age curves) are associated with higher
fertility (respectively, higher average age of giving birth). Now let i, j ∈ {Low,High}.
It then follows immediately that any observed (Φi,Ψj) can be explained by the (c, ǫ)-
pair at which the iso-fertility curve associated with fertility Φi intersects the iso-age
curve associated with average age of giving birth Ψj .
The above result is very important for understanding the evidence reported in
Figure 1, which shows that amongst countries with similar very low fertility rates (the
“East” and “South”) there is a considerable variation in the proportion of births to
older women, while amongst countries with similar high proportion of births to older
women (the “South” and the “North”), there is a considerable variation in fertility
rates. Two points should be emphasized in this regard. First, it is interesting to note
that variations in c alone are potentially sufficient to explain the most distinctive
features of the reproductive patterns in the “East” on the one side and in the “North”
on the other. Indeed if we compare two countries that are otherwise identical but one
has well established formal daycare for younger children (a low c) while the other has
low public spending on childcare (a high c), then the latter country will have a lower
total fertility rate and childbearing will predominantly occur at younger ages, while
the former country will have a higher total fertility rate and higher proportions of
childbearing at older ages. Stated differently, cross-country variations in the quality
and availability of formal childcare generate a positive correlation between fertility
and the incidence of childbearing at older ages, as observed in Figure 1. Moreover,
while only suggestive, these results are consistent with some more detailed facts
gleaned from cross-sectional data (Table 1). For, compared to the countries of Eastern
Europe, public expenditure on childcare is much larger in the countries of Northern
and Western Europe.9 Just as public expenditure on childcare differs greatly between
countries, enrolment in daycare for children aged 0-3 also varies significantly, with
most of the countries of Eastern Europe displaying the lowest enrolment rates. To
the extent that the Eastern European countries display very low total fertility rates
(TFRs) and proportions of births to older women (PBOs), and to the extent that
Northern and Western European countries have relatively high TFRs and PBOs, our
9Public expenditure on childcare is all public financial support for families participating in formal
day-care services (e.g. day care centers and family care for children under the age of 3).
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Table 1: Quality and Availability of Childcare in Industrialized
and Emerging Countries
Public Expenditure on Enrolment Rate of Children
Chilcare (% of GDP)1 Aged 0-3 in Daycare (%)2
Northern Europe:
Denmark 1.0 61.7
Finland 1.0 35.0
Norway 0.7 43.7
Sweden 0.8 39.5
Western Europe:
France 0.5 26.0
Belgium 0.2 38.5
United Kingdom 0.2 25.8
Germany 0.0 9.0
Eastern Europe:
Poland 0.0 2.0
Czech Republic 0.1 3.0
Hungary 0.1 6.9
Slovak Republic 0.1 17.7
Southern Europe:
Italy 0.1 6.3
Spain 0.1 20.7
Portugal 0.4 23.5
Greece 0.2 7.0
1Source: OECD [2007a]. 2Source: OECD [2007b].
Table 2: Family Gap in Industrialized and Emerging
Regions
Region Family Gap in Pay1
Southern 0.360
Liberal 0.349
Continental 0.302
Nordic 0.247
Eastern 0.183
1Source: Dupuy and Ferna´ndez-Kranz (2007, Table 11). South-
ern countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. Liberal countries are
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and US. Continental coun-
tries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany
and Switzerland. Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden. Eastern countries are the Czech Republic, E. Ger-
many, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and
Slovenia.
model is consistent with this evidence.
Second, while variations in c can explain the most distinctive features of the
reproductive patterns in the “North” and the “East” respectively, they are not suffi-
cient to account for the demographic distinctiveness of Southern European countries,
where very low TFRs (as in the “East”) go hand in hand with high PBOs (as in the
“North”). To account for this distinctiveness, we need to recognize that countries
vary simultaneously in more than one economic factor. Our theory tells us that the
distinctive reproductive patterns in the “South” can be explained by a comparatively
high “price of motherhood” or “family gap in pay”,10 as captured by a high value of
ǫ. Several studies have recently looked at variations in the family gap across Europe
(Davies and Pierre [2005], Dupuy and Ferna´ndez-Kranz [2007]). These studies find
that the penalty in pay associated with motherhood is at its largest in the coun-
tries of Southern Europe. For example, Dupuy and Ferna´ndez-Kranz [2007] estimate
that mothers in Southern Europe suffer a wage penalty up to two times as large as
mothers in Eastern European and Nordic countries (see Table 2). To the extent that
the countries of Southern Europe display a systematic pattern of lowest-low TFRs
combined with high PBOs, our model is consistent with this estimate.
10See Waldfogel [1998] for a comprehensive survey.
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3.4. An Example. We have already seen that our model provides a simple theory
of differences in fertility and age patterns of childbearing, and of some of their main
economic correlates. To illustrate this in more detail, we now take as a reference point
the “Postponded Childbearing” regime and consider a simple numerical example. Let
the wage that an individual receives be given by w(e) = e. Assume that ability a is
distributed according to the Pareto distribution F (a) = 1− a−β. Empirical evidence
suggests that a value of β between 1.5 and 2 fits the mid-upper range of most income
distributions. For example, a value of 1.688 has been estimated on IRS data for the
United States. Thus, assume that β = 2. To complete the parametric setup, let
p1 = 0.95, p2 = 0.8, and ρ = 0.9. Now, for this example, the fertility rate and the
incidence of childbearing at older ages are respectively given by
Φ = 0.99− 1.52
[
(γ1 − 0.8γ2)(0.9ǫ+ 0.28c)
−1
(3.8− 1.72c− 0.9ǫ)
]−2
− 0.8
[
4γ2
0.9c(3.8− 0.72c)
]−2
(25)
Ψ =
0.04
Φ
+
6.08
Φ
[
(γ1 − 0.8γ2)(0.9ǫ+ 0.28c)
−1
(3.8− 1.72c− 0.9ǫ)
]−2
−
0.8
Φ
[
4γ2
0.9c(3.8− 0.72c)
]−2
(26)
We now proceed as follows. First, we fix empirically observed values of (Φ,Ψ) and
(c, ǫ) for a particular group of countries (say the “East”), and use (25) and (26) to
derive preference parameters (γ1, γ2) that rationalize (Φ,Ψ) and (c, ǫ). Having done
that, we fix the preference parameters (γ1, γ2) at their derived values, allow (Φ,Ψ) to
vary to fit empirically observed values for a different group of countries (the “South”
or the “North”), and predict the corresponding values of (c, ǫ). Throughout, we will
normalize observed rates of fertility relative to the replacement rate of 2.1.
Suppose we take it from Figure 1 that the fertility rate of a representative country
in the “East” and in the “South” is Φ = 1.3
2.1
, while the fertility rate of a representative
country in the “North” is Φ = 1.8
2.1
. Next, we take it from Figure 1 that the proportion
of births to older women is Ψ = 0.3 in the “East”, and Ψ = 0.5 in the “South” and
the “North”. Finally, Table 1 indicates that the quality and availability of childcare
in the “East” is very low, and as a point of comparison we set c = 0.95; Table 2
suggests a penalty in pay of 18 percent for mothers in the “East” and hence we
choose ǫ = 0.18. Using (25) and (26), we can now compute preferences parameters,
(γ1, γ2), that rationalize the values of (Φ,Ψ) and (c, ǫ) chosen for the “East”, and then
use the derived values of (γ1, γ2) to predict values of (c, ǫ) that explain reproductive
patterns in the “South” and the “North”, respectively.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Figure 4. Several interesting ob-
servations can be derived from this numerical example. First, the figure confirms
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Figure 4: A Numerical Example. The figure is based
on the following parameter values: p1 = 0.95, p2 = 0.8,
ρ = 0.9, β = 2, γ1 ≃ 1.21, γ2 ≃ 1.15.
that appropriate parameters, c and ǫ, can be found to rationalize the different re-
productive patterns observed in Figure 1. Interestingly enough, the differences in
the availability of childcare, c, and the family gap in pay, ǫ, predicted by our model
are qualitatively in line with the evidence reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Second, our simple framework does a good job of explaining existing reproductive
patterns without appealing to systematic cross-country differences in the preference
parameters γ1 and γ2. Naturally, this explanation is excessively simple, and neither
the model’s message, nor its practical implication, is that socio-cultural attitudes
and behavioral norms prevalent in different countries are not important for existing
reproductive patterns.11 However, the simplicity of our framework makes it clear
11Indeed, while our model provides a theory of differences in reproductive behavior and some of
their main economic determinants, to precisely predict country-specific outcomes one may need to
allow for variations in γ1 and γ2. There are several reasons to believe that preferences and attitudes
affecting the utility from entering parenthood at different ages might vary across countries. Here
we mention two. First, there are considerable differences in the emancipation of the youth between
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that labor market factors that affect the earnings opportunities of mothers and social
policies that affect the costs of raising children are key forces that shape reproductive
behavior. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the conclusions drawn in the previous
subsection applied to both the “Early Childbearing” and the “Postponded Childbear-
ing” regime. Here we have seen that the reproductive patterns in industrialized and
emerging countries can be broadly rationalized within the “Postponed Childbearing”
regime, where a fraction of the population deliberately postpones the attempt to have
a child to older ages. We also considered a numerical example in which we took the
“Early Childbearing” regime as a reference point. The reproductive patterns that
emerged in this case were much harder to justify on statistical grounds, at least in
the context of industrialized and emerging countries. The explanation for this dis-
crepancy is that the “Early Childbearing” regime generates proportions of births to
older women that are considerably lower than those observed in industrialized and
emerging countries.
4. The Effects of Improvements in Assisted Reproduction
Having established that our simple framework does a good job of explaining existing
reproductive patterns across countries, we now turn our attention to the next issue
of concern, namely, to analyze the effects of improvements in assisted reproductive
technologies (ART) on fertility rates. We also ask whether the availability of new
ART can have different effects for countries that already have low levels of fertility
than for those with a higher level of fertility. Interestingly, the answer is yes: under
the “weak family countries” of Northern and Western Europe and the “strong family countries” of
Southern Europe: in Northern Europe the preferred mode of reaching independence and autonomy
is for the youth to leave the parental home early, which in fact constitutes a precondition for making
individual choices on parenthood (Billari et al. [2001]); in Southern Europe, the young stay with
their parents well into adulthood, and leave only at the time of marriage (Giuliano [2007]); parents
discourage an early departure from the family by placing minimal restrictions on their children’s
comings and going, giving them limited domestic responsibility, and paying their household expenses,
making it almost unreasonable to leave (Dalla Zuanna [2001], Martinez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo
[2002]). The cover offered by the parental family leads to increased opportunity costs of leaving the
parental home, which, in turn, is an obstacle to entering parenthood at a young age. Second, an
indirect effect of the late departure from the parental home is that young men, never having had
domestic responsibility, have no experience of housework, and thus do not help out in the home,
even if their wives are in full-time employment (Dalla Zuanna [2001], Sobotka [2004]). The attitude
of male partners, and the resulting excessive burden for women, can be considered important in
reducing the utility females derive from entering parenthood at a young age.
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conditions that we shall identify, improvements in assisted reproduction can have a
positive effect in low-fertility countries, a negative effect in high-fertility countries,
and so lead to a convergence of fertility rates across countries.
4.1. Biomedical versus Behavioral Effects. We characterize improvements in
assisted reproduction in a simple reduced form, by supposing that they lead to an
exogenous increase in the probability of conception success at older ages, captured
by the parameter p2.
• Case EC: “Early Childbearing”. We begin by examining the effects that would
arise in the “early childbearing” scenario; that is, we study improvements in assisted
reproduction with ∆ 6 1. Here, as we saw in the previous subsection, a fraction
F (a˜) of individuals will try to have a child in period 1, with the conception success
probability being p1; of those who fail to conceive, a fraction F (a0) will try again in
period 2, the conception success probability being p2, while the remaining fraction
[F (a˜)−F (a0)] will choose to stay childless. We now show for ∆ 6 1 that improvements
in ART will lead to higher fertility rates:
Proposition 4 In the “Early Childbearing” regime (∆ 6 1), an improvement in
assisted reproduction, represented by an increase in p2, raises the fertility rate.
To see this, observe from (13) that
ηΦp2 = Ψ
[
1 + g(a0)η
a0
p2
]
. (27)
From (8) it follows that
ηa0p2 =
[
1−
(z00 − z01)Vˆ
′(z00)
Vˆ (z00)− Vˆ (z01)
]
, (28)
where z00 ≡ 1 + ρ and z01 ≡ 1 + ρ(1 − p2c). Given the convexity of Vˆ (z), it is
straightforward to see that ηa0p2 > 1.
12 It is clear from (??) that the total demographic
effect of an increase in p2 is the sum of two positive effects:
(i) The first term, Ψ, represents the percentage change in fertility due to the direct
biomedical effect of new ART. After the rise in p2, individuals who failed to have
a child in period 1 and choose to try again in period 2 have a larger chance of
conception success, and so the total fertility rate increases.
12Formally, since Vˆ ′(z) > 0 and Vˆ ′′(z) > 0, and since z00 − z01 > 0, it follows that Vˆ
′(z01) <
[Vˆ (z00)− Vˆ (z01)]/(z00 − z01), and hence that η
a0
p2
> 0.
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(ii) The second term, [Ψg(a0)η
a0
p2
], represents the change in fertility that arises from
an indirect behavioral effect which increases the proportion of individuals who
try to have a child in both period 1 and period 2. Before the rise in p2, a
fraction (1 − p1)[F (a˜) − F (a0)] of individuals who tried but failed to have a
child in period 1 did not try again for a child in period 2 and so chose to remain
childless. Now, as p2 rises, some individuals switch their behavior in period 2
from “not trying” to “trying”. As a consequence, there now exists a group of
individuals who end up having a child that they would otherwise not have had.
Notice that the indirect behavioral effect works through a0, the critical ability level at
which individuals who tried to have a child in period 1 and failed decide to try again
for a child in period 2. In predicting how an increase in p2 will affect a0, there are two
opposing effects to consider. On the one hand, an increase in p2 raises the expected
utility from having a child in period 2, and so pushes individuals who would otherwise
not have tried to have child in period 2 into trying to have one – and so increases
a0. On the other hand, an increase in p2 reduces the expected returns to education
and so lowers the amount of education that people trying to have child in period 2
will get. This raises the earnings gap between trying and not trying in period 2, and
so reduces a0. However, since the former effect always dominates the latter, the net
effect of improvements in assisted reproduction is to increase the critical ability level
a0, causing the population-weighted number of births to go up.
• Case PC: “Postponed Childbearing”. In the case of “Early Childbearing” we
found that fertility rates are boosted when new ART becomes available. The more
interesting question is whether ART is desirable in the case of “Postponed Child-
bearing”, which is broadly descriptive of the reproductive behavior observed in in-
dustrialized and emerging countries. Therefore, let us now turn to the analysis of
our model with ∆ > 1. As we noted earlier, the requirement ∆ > 1 embodies the
conditions under which a fraction [F (a0) − F (a1)] of individuals will postpone the
attempt to have a child to period 2. Aside from this group of “late childbearers”, a
fraction F (a1) of individuals will try to have a child in period 1 and, if unsuccessful,
will try again in period 2.
Proposition 5 In the “Postponed Childbearing” regime (∆ > 1), an improvement
in assisted reproduction, represented by an increase in p2, has the potential to either
increase or to reduce the fertility rate.
To gain intuition for the effects that arise from improvements in ART, it is useful
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to examine the formula for the elasticity of the fertility rate with respect to p2. For
∆ > 1, this elasticity can be written in simplified form as
ηΦp2 = Ψ+ [1− (1− p2)(1−Ψ)]g(a0)η
a0
p2
+ [(1− p2)(1−Ψ)]g(a1)η
a1
p2
. (29)
We have already observed that ηa0p2 > 0. From (9) and (28) it is straightforward to
establish that
ηa1p2 =
[
p2γ2
γ1 − p2γ2
][
(a1 − a0)V
′(z01)(z00 − z01)− p2γ2η
a0
p2
]
, (30)
where z00 ≡ 1 + ρ and z01 ≡ 1 + ρ(1 − p2c). Since, to be in the “Postponed Child-
bearing” regime, it must be that a1 < a0, it follows immediately that η
a1
p2
< 0. In
assessing the case for or against ART, there are now three effects to consider:
(i) The first term, Ψ, represents the percentage change in fertility due to the direct
biomedical effect of new ART; its sign is positive.
(ii) The second term, [(·)g(a0)η
a0
p2
], captures an indirect behavioral effect that rein-
forces the direct biomedical effect of improved ART. It arises from individuals
who switch behavior from “voluntary childlessness” to “postponed childbear-
ing” and so represents a reduction in the incidence of voluntary childlessness.
Before the rise in p2, a fraction [1 − F (a0)] of individuals made the deliberate
choice to remain childless and so contributed nothing to the total fertility rate.
Now, as p2 rises, the availability of improved ART causes some women who
would otherwise have not tried to have children later in life to try to do so, and
this increases the fertility rate.
(iii) The third term, [(·)g(a1)η
a1
p2
], is negative, and hence is the one that could po-
tentially undo the positive effects of ART and result in a reduction of the total
fertility rate. Indeed, for ART to have negative demographic consequences, the
third term must be larger in absolute magnitude than the first and the second
term. The third term represents an indirect behavioral effect that arises from
individuals that switch from the “early childbearing” to the “postponed child-
bearing” group. Before the rise in p2, these individuals tried to have a child in
period 1 and, if the failed, tried again in period 2. Their lifetime conception
success probability was p1 + (1 − p1)p2. Now, as these individuals postpone
childbearing to period 2, their lifetime conception success probability falls to
p2, which means that with probability p1(1−p2) they will end up not having the
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child that they would otherwise have had. Thus, the availability of improved
ART causes some women who would otherwise have tried to have children ear-
lier on in life to postpone childbirth to later in life when, despite ART, the
probability of conception is lower. This results in a reduction of the fertility
rate.
Thus, while improvements in assisted reproduction should have a direct biomedical
effect of raising fertility, they could cause indirect changes in behavior which could
either reinforce or offset the direct effect.
4.2. Macroeconomic Perspectives. We have just observed that the effects of im-
provements in ART are ambiguous in the case of “Postponed Childbearing”. Suppose
we take it that this case applies to industrialized and emerging countries. Then we
know that different groups of countries exhibit significant variations with respect to
fertility rates and age patterns of childbearing. An important question in this regard
is whether the economic factors that give rise to these variations will also create sys-
tematic differences in the responsiveness of different groups of countries to ART, and,
if so, whether the responsiveness is higher or lower in countries where the fertility
rate is already low. In particular, is it possible that improvements in ART cause the
fertility rate to rise in one group of countries and to fall in another, and therefore
lead to a convergence or divergence of fertility rates across countries?
The simplest way to get at this question is to investigate how the elasticity of the
fertility rate with respect to ART varies between countries with different reproductive
patterns. We do so by making two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that
ability a is distributed according to the Pareto distribution F (a) = 1− a−β . Notice
that this assumption allows us to rewrite g(a) as
g(a) = β
[
1− F (a)
F (a)
]
. (31)
Second, suppose we use the linear approximations to a0 and a1 as characterized in
equations (21) and (22), respectively. It is readily established that these approxima-
tions imply that
ηa0p2 ≈ 0
13 and ηa1p2 ≈
[
p2γ2
γ1 − γ2p2
][
a1
a0
− 1
]
. (32)
13This is consistent with the fact, from (28), that when we take linear approximations to Vˆ (z00)
and Vˆ (z01), then η
a0
p2
≈ 0.
26
Now define
k ≡ β(1− p2)p1
[
p2γ2
γ1 − p2γ2
]
,
noticing that k is positive. Then, using (31) and (32), we can rewrite (29) as
ηΦp2 = Ψ−
k(1−Ψ)
p1
[
1− F (a1)
F (a1)
] [
1−
a1
a0
]
. (33)
Let us think of this elasticity as being a measure for the responsiveness of the fertility
rate in a given country to ART. What remains to be established is the correlation
between this elasticity and a country’s underlying fertility rate and age pattern of
childbearing. With the specific functional form of F (·), and with the definitions of Φ
and Ψ in (15) and (16), it is straightforward to check that
F (a0) =
Φ[Ψ + p2(1−Ψ)]
p2
a0 =
[
1−
Φ[Ψ + p2(1−Ψ)]
p2
]− 1
β
F (a1) =
Φ(1−Ψ)
p1
a1 =
[
1−
Φ(1−Ψ)
p1
]− 1
β
, (34)
making explicit the dependence of the elasticity of the fertility rate on (Φ,Ψ).14
Formally, substituting (34) into (33), we get
ηΦp2(Φ,Ψ) = Ψ−
k
Φ
[
1−
Φ(1−Ψ)
p1
]1−
(
1− Φ[Ψ+p2(1−Ψ)]
p2
1− Φ(1−Ψ)
p1
) 1
β

 . (35)
A first question is whether improvements in ART can have different effects for coun-
tries with a low level of fertility than for those with a higher level of fertility. To begin
with, suppose that the coefficient k is constant across countries. This amounts to as-
suming that there are no systematic differences in preferences (γ1, γ2) and conception
success probabilities (p1, p2) across countries. Next define the threshold kˆ(Φ,Ψ) to
be that value of k such that the elasticity of the fertility rate with respect to ART
is zero. Formally, let kˆ(Φ,Ψ) be the solution to ηΦp2(Φ,Ψ) = 0. Comparing kˆ(Φ,Ψ)
across countries with different reproductive patterns, we have the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 6 Consider two countries, one with a high level of fertility (ΦH), the
other with a low level of fertility (ΦL). Assuming that the two countries are otherwise
14Notice that since F (a0) 6 1, then F (a0) =
Φ[Ψ+p2(1−Ψ)]
p2
implies the restriction Φ 6 p2
p2+Ψ(1−p2)
.
In what follows, we will therefore have to be careful in how we choose to normalize the fertility rate
and set the value for p2.
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identical, then for any β > 1 the two country-specific thresholds on k are such that
kˆ(ΦH , ·) < kˆ(ΦL, ·).
a. If k < kˆ(ΦH , ·), then an improvement in assisted reproduction raises the fertility
rate in both the high-fertility and the low-fertility country;
b. If k > kˆ(ΦL, ·), then an improvement in assisted reproduction reduces the fer-
tility rate in both the high-fertility and the low-fertility country;
c. However, if kˆ(ΦH , ·) < k < kˆ(ΦL, ·), then an improvement in assisted repro-
duction reduces fertility in the high-fertility country, and raises fertility in the
low-fertility country.
Proving this proposition amounts to showing that the elasticity of the fertility rate
with respect to ART is strictly decreasing in Φ.15 The details of the proof are relegated
to the appendix. The main message here is as follows. In general, countries with high
levels of fertility are less responsive to improvements in ART than countries with low
levels of fertility. Moreover, depending on the value of k, the availability of new
ART can have differential effects for countries with low levels of fertility than for
those with high levels of fertility. On one side, if k is small enough, then the effect
of ART will be positive for both high- and low-fertility countries; if instead k is
large enough, then the effect of ART will be negative for both high- and low-fertility
countries. Interestingly enough, there are good reasons for thinking that these two
cases will arise only for extreme preference configurations: the former case (k small)
will emerge only if individuals have strong preferences for having children at a young
age (γ1
γ2
large), while the latter case (k large) will emerge only if individuals have
strong preferences for having children at an old age (γ1
γ2
small). Finally, there exists
an intermediate range of values of k in which improvements in assisted reproduction
will have a positive effect in low-fertility countries and a negative effect in high-fertility
countries. At face value, this suggests that improvements in assisted reproduction
could produce a convergence of fertility rates across high- and low-fertility countries.
Figure 5 illustrates this possibility, extending the numerical example developed
in the previous section. The elasticity of the fertility rate with respect to ART
can be computed in two different ways. The first method, which is based on linear
approximations to (a0, a1), follows the macro-perspective developed in the present
15Notice that the proposition holds only for parameters satisfying β > 1. As we noted earlier, how-
ever, empirical evidence suggests that a value of β between 1.5 and 2 fits most earnings distributions.
Thus, the restriction β > 1 is justified on statistical grounds.
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Figure 5: Numerical Example Revisited. The exam-
ple is based on the following parameter values: p1 =
0.95, p2 = 0.8, ρ = 0.9, β = 2, γ1 ≃ 1.21, γ2 ≃ 1.15.
The implied value of k ≡ β(1 − p2)p1
[
p2γ2
γ1−p2γ2
]
is
k = 1.2.
section. The strategy is to use biomedical figures on (p1, p2), observed values for
(Φ,Ψ), and a value of k that is consistent with the parametric setup from the earlier
example to calculate (35) for a typical country in the “North”, the “South”, and the
“East”. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.A. In general, the (Φ,Ψ)-space can be
divided into two regions, indicating whether improvements in ART have a negative or
positive effect on fertility. Notice that the boundary between the two regions, Φ(Ψ), is
strictly decreasing in Ψ. This suggests that, for the parameters under consideration,
the elasticity of the fertility rate with respect to ART is not only strictly decreasing in
Φ, but also strictly decreasing in Ψ. Thus, our model predicts that we are most likely
to see negative effects of ART in countries where both fertility and the incidence of
childbearing at older ages are high. For example, for a typical country in the “North”,
we calculate that a 10 percent increase in the conception success probability p2 would
reduce the fertility rate by roughly 1 percent. Conversely, for representative countries
in the “South” and in the “East”, a 10 percent increase in the effectiveness of assisted
production would raise the fertility rate by roughly 1 percent.
An alternative way of calculating the elasticity of the fertility rate with respect
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to ART is to look at the differences in (c, ǫ) that give rise to observed variations in
(Φ,Ψ). Unlike the above approach, this method does not rely on linear approxima-
tions to (a0, a1), and uses (25) as the basis for all computations. The strategy is
to compute the elasticity of the fertility rate based on (c, ǫ)-combinations that ra-
tionalize the reproductive patterns observed in the “North”, the “South”, and the
“East”. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.B. The figure divides the (c, ǫ)-space
into two subregions, indicating whether improvements in assisted reproduction have
a negative or positive effect on fertility. Notice first that the elasticities computed for
the three hypothetical countries are qualitatively similar to ones reported in Figure
5.A. This suggests the macro-perspective developed in this section provides a reli-
able short-cut to predicting the effects of improvements in assisted reproduction. In
line with our previous observations, the results suggest that improvements in ART
are most likely to have negative effects on the fertility rate for (c, ǫ)-configurations
that give rise to high fertility rates and high proportions of births to older women.
Intuitively, the negative behavioral effect that induces people to postpone childbirth
is more pronounced in economic environments that are conducive to high levels of
fertility in the first place. Indeed, the better the availability of formal childcare (low
c), and the lower the family gap in pay (low ǫ), the more likely it is that improvements
in assisted reproduction lead to worse fertility outcomes.
5. Conclusion
This paper has pursued two related themes. Our primary concern has been to examine
the relationship between assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and the microe-
conomics of fertility choice. Along the way we have put forward a simple model that
does a good job in explaining existing reproductive patterns across industrialized and
emerging countries.
We have demonstrated that the model’s predictions about the main economic
correlates of reproductive behavior accord well with a considerable body of cross-
country facts. Our model, in particular, suggests that cross-country differences in (i)
labor market factors that affect the earnings opportunities of mothers and (ii) social
policies that affect the cost of raising children are key forces shaping differences in
reproductive behavior.
Our analysis of ART has centered around the distinction between biomedical
and behavioral effects. While improvements in assisted reproduction should have
the direct biomedical effect of raising fertility, they could cause indirect changes
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in behavior which could offset the direct effect. In particular, the availability of
improved ART could cause some women who would otherwise have tried to have
children earlier on in life to postpone childbirth to later in life when, despite ART,
the conception success probability is lower. We have shown that this behavioral effect
of postponement may result in a reduction of the fertility rate.
From a practical standpoint, the findings in this paper suggest that improving
ART is no panacea for the problem of stabilizing fertility rates. The negative be-
havioral effect that induces people to postpone childbirth is most pronounced in
economic environments that are conducive to high levels of fertility. Indeed, we have
demonstrated that an improvement in assisted reproduction can have a negative effect
in high-fertility countries, a positive effect in low-fertility countries, and so lead to a
convergence of fertility rates across countries. Overall, our results suggest that under-
standing the consequences of ART does require exploring its behavioral implications
in different economic environment.
This paper is only a first step towards an analysis of assisted reproductive tech-
nologies from an economic perspective and leaves open many questions. From a
macroeconomic perspective, it would be interesting to embed the present framework
in a model of economic growth (Barro and Becker [1989], Becker et al. [1990]), and
use the model to assess the effects of ART and other population policy measures
on population and income growth. From a microeconomic perspective, it would be
interesting to assess the effects of ART in a dynamic bargaining model of the house-
hold, which recognizes that a household’s choices about whether and when to have
children, and the impact of these choices on women’s earnings, can affect the house-
hold’s balance of power (Basu [2006]). Many other interesting questions, such as the
effects of ART on the formation and duration of relationships, make up a rather rich
agenda for further research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6. Let kˆ(Φ,Ψ) be the solution to ηp2Φ = 0, where η
p2
Φ is
defined in (35). Since ηp2Φ is strictly decreasing in k, to establish that kˆ(Φ,Ψ) is
strictly decreasing in Φ, it is sufficient to show that ηp2Φ is strictly decreasing in Φ.
Differentiating ηp2Φ with respect to Φ, we obtain
∂η
p2
Φ
∂Φ
=
k
βΦ2
[
β
(
1−
a1
a0
)
+ F (a1)
a1
a0
− F (a0)
1− F (a1)
1− F (a0)
a1
a0
]
. (A.1)
After substituting F (a) = 1− a−β into the right-hand side of (A.1), simplifying, and
rearranging, it follows that:
∂η
p2
Φ
∂Φ
S 0⇐⇒ Γ(β) ≡ β
(
a0
a1
)1−β
+ (1− β)
(
a1
a0
)β
S 1. (A.2)
We now note that
Γ′(β) =
(
a0
a1
)1−β [
1− β ln
(
a0
a1
)]
−
(
a1
a0
)β [
1− (1− β) ln
(
a1
a0
)]
. (A.3)
Hence, it follows that the function Γ(β) has unique stationary point, namely at
βˆ =
(
a0
a1
− 1
)
+ ln
(
a1
a0
)
a0
a1
ln
(
a0
a1
)
+ ln
(
a1
a0
) . (A.4)
It is now readily checked that, for any a0
a1
> 1, we have:
Γ′(0) > 0 and Γ′(1) < 0. (A.5)
Hence, it follows that the unique stationary point βˆ occurs in the interval (0, 1) and
is the point at which Γ(·) achieves a maximum. Finally, since Γ(0) = 1 and Γ(1) = 1,
and since Γ′(0) > 1 and Γ′(1) < 0, it follows immediately that
Γ(β) S 1⇐⇒ β T 1. (A.6)
This, in turn, implies that ηp2Φ is strictly decreasing [increasing] in Φ if β > [<]1,
which establishes the proposition.
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